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Various recent articles have addressed the morality of the use of
methotrexate for the treatment of tubal pregnancies. \ Authors disagree
insofar as they emphasize different features and arrive at different
conclusions regarding whether methotrexate treatment for tubal pregnancies
is appropriate in Catholic hospitals. Despite their differences, most authors
display a remarkable agreement about what the fundamental issues are.
Typically, an author begins by describing the diagnosis and prognosis of
tubal pregnancy and the basic treatment options: expectant management,
salpingectomy, salpingostomy, and methotrexate.2 The morality of each
approach is assessed, then, in light of the distinction between direct and
indirect abortions. Methotrexate receives extended attention because of its
technical advantages over the surgical options and because it is not obvious
how to apply to this medical approach moral principles first articulated for
surgical procedures. In particular, authors discuss the pharmacology of
methotrexate, its relation to the distinction between direct and indirect
abortion, the formulation of the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Facilities, the diagnosis of ectopic implantation as
itself pathological, and the status of the trophoblastic tissue.
The purpose of this article is twofold: (1) to state the fundamental
difficulties of the moral dimension of this problem with somewhat greater
concision than has appeared in one place so far; (2) to open an avenue to a
solution that is different in kind from any that has appeared so far. For the
former, it is sufficient to bring attention succinctly to what has been noted in
various places. For the latter, it is necessary to approach the question in a
manner completely unlike that adopted by most authors. Most authors
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approach the question in a casuistic manner. This means that they try to
apply general moral principles to real or imagined cases or situations. The
principles, usually drawn at least in part from the Ethical and Religious
Directives, tend to be conceived legalistically in the sense that they are taken
to permit or forbid certain actions, with the result that different treatment
modalities are judged "licit" or "illicit." Catholic faith, through the Ethical
and Religious Directives, is understood to present limitations on the freedom
both of patients and of medical personnel within Catholic hospitals. Almost
nothing is said about the character of life toward which Catholic faith urges
us. Casuistry tends to frame moral phenomena as arising in tension between
liberty and obligation or law. In other words, the emphasis of the casuistic
approach falls upon whether a particular procedure is proscribed or
permitted, not upon the moral character of the person who makes one
decision or another in a medical context. This article suggests that it is
helpful to look less closely at the law and more closely at the reason for the
law. This different approach is not a way of diminishing the significance of
moral obligation. Rather, it is a recognition that our moral lives involve more
than simply fulfilling the "moral law" in much the same way that raising our
children amounts to a good deal more than fu lfilling an obligation to provide
for offspring.

A Paradigmatic Case
Recently in these pages Peter A. Clark, SJ., Ph.D., has provided an
instructive discussion of methotrexate and tubal pregnancies. 3 His essay
reviews the medical features of the situation and summarizes the arguments
that others have offered both for and against methotrexate. He presents the
matter as arising for him in the form of the case of "Judy and Ray." If one
were inventing a case in order to present the issue with sharp clarity, one
could scarcely do better than Fr. Clark's case. Judy, in her thirties, has one
blocked fallopian tube and has just been diagnosed with a tubal ectopic
pregnancy. Expectant management may resolve the matter, but runs the risk
of tubal rupture and the loss of her functioning fallopian tube.
Salpingectomy, full or partial removal of the tube, is also supposed to leave
her infertile. Fr. Clark says that salpingostomy is direct abortion, which
renders it incompatible with the Catholic faith.4 Methotrexate, administered
systemically or injected directly into the fallopian tube, appears to be the
best way to allow her to preserve her fertility. The question that Fr. Clark
confronts as a bioethicist is whether methotrexate is "morally justifiable by
the Catholic Church."
In this case, the difficulty appears in the confrontation between the
noble hopes and desires of Judy and Ray, on the one hand, and the "moral
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law" as articulated by the Catholic Church, on the other. Judy and Ray "very
much want to have children," but have had difficulty conceiving. Now they
find themselves threatened not only with the loss of this pregnancy, but also
with the loss of Judy's fertility, ifher fallopian tube cannot be preserved. We
read that, due to their circumstances, their chances of adoption are "slim." If
they very much want children, they very much want to find a way to
preserve Judy's fertility. On the other side, Catholic moral teaching, as
expressed in the Ethical and Religious Directives, is presented as a source of
limitations on their therapeutic options. Fr. Clark presents us, then, with an
exceptionally pure confrontation between freedom and law: Does the moral
law forbidding direct abortion prohibit Judy and Ray from the use of
methotrexate or are they free to employ it in an effort to preserve their future
fertility?
Four Difficulties
The various articles already published on tubal pregnancy review the
clinical details and include references to the medical literature for additional
information. It is not necessary to recount that information here. Instead, it is
appropriate to draw attention to four areas in which there is some uncertainty
that is morally relevant.
First, there is some disagreement about the best way to understand
the trophoblastic tissue and placenta. One view is that after conception the
early cellular division that results in the differentiation of the cytoblast (or
inner cell mass) from the trophoblast should be understood as the emergence
of what will yield the embryo proper from tissue or cellular material upon
which the embryo is biologically dependent, but from which it is
onto logically distinct. On this view, the placenta, too, is understood to be
something instrumentally necessary for the fetus, but not an integral part of
it. The alternative view asserts that the placenta is an organ of the fetus and
that, similarly, the trophoblastic tissue and cytoblast constitute one whole.
The fact that the placenta is discarded at birth should not prevent us from
recognizing that the placenta develops from the chorionic membrane of the
embryo and is significantly (though not exclusively) composed of tissue that
is genetically identical to the child. Because the placenta is essential to the
child's ability to carry on the processes of acquiring nutrition and
eliminating waste (which are necessary for any living being), the placenta
must be understood as an organ integral to the fetus. Attention is focused on
this disagreement because it can be argued that if the placenta and the
trophoblastic tissue from which it arises are integral to the embryo or fetus,
then any deliberate destruction of this tissue (medically or surgically)
amounts .to a direct assault on the life, even the very body of the child.
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Alternatively, if it can be convincingly maintained that these tissues are
distinct from the child, this may help support the argument that in some
circumstances the destruction of these tissues may be fairly cast as only
indirectly harmful to the child. This argument would be drawn on the model
of the classic case ofthe removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus. If
sufficiently serious reasons can be advanced for the destruction of the
placenta or trophoblast, despite the foreseeable consequences for the child,
the argument is that this amounts only to an indirect abortion.
Second, there is some uncertainty about the pharmacology of
methotrexate. We know that the effect of methotrexate (MTX) is to prevent
cellular division by inhibiting DNA replication. "Actively proliferating
tissues, such as malignant cells, bone marrow, fetal and trophoblastic cells,
dermal epithelium, buccal and intestinal mucosa, and the urinary bladder
epithelium, are most susceptible."s However, "It is still largely unknown
how MTX affects the invasive property of the trophoblast and the growth of
placental chorionic villi and why some EPs [ectopic pregnancies] fail to
respond to MTX, why tubal ruptures occur, and whether the inflammatory
response is influenced by MTX. ,,6 This makes it unclear whether the effect
of the administration of methotrexate is necessarily directly destructive of
the embryo proper? or it is instead plausible to argue that methotrexate
operates only or primarily upon the trophoblastic cells and the maternal cells
at the site of implantation.8 It is easy to see connections between this
difficulty and the preceding one regarding the status of the trophoblast or
placenta as integral to the developing child. It also bears a relation to the
difficulty that will be discussed next.
Third, it can be argued that in the case of a tubal ectopic pregnancy,
implantation in the tube amounts to a pathological condition that is lifethreatening for both mother and child. 9 As a result, inhibiting or undoing the
process of implantation is best understood not as abortion (termination of
pregnancy prior to viability) but as a therapeutic intervention to halt and
reverse a destructive process that will ultimately lead to the death of the
embryo and possibly the mother. In other words, medically (or for that
matter surgically) interfering with implantation in the tube has a different
clinical meaning than would the same action directed against implantation in
the uterus. The eventual death of the child is an indirect result of a directly
therapeutic intervention of a serious pathology. The alternative view
maintains that the preceding assessment involves a misunderstanding either
of the biological facts or of the moral situation. To put it simply we might
say that what has just been said to be a therapeutic intervention is in fact the
termination of the life of the embryo or of the trophoblastic tissue on which
its life depends. In other words, there is no "pathology" here that is
independent of the developing child. To characterize the embryo or the
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trophoblastic tissue on which it depends as a pathology is an abstraction,
ignoring that this is some part of the growing child. Or it is a mistaken view
of how methotrexate operates, which does not merely protect or restore to
health maternal tissue, but directly destroys fetal tissue, the embryo and/or
the tissue on which its life depends~o
Fourth, there is some doubt about how to understand the
significance of the reformulation of the guidance offered by The Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. The 1971 version of
this document offered a detailed version of the conditions required for
intervention relative to ectopic pregnancy.
In extrauterine pregnancy the affected part of the mother
(e.g., cervix, ovary, or fallopian tube) may be removed,
even though fetal death is foreseen, provided that:
(a) the affected part is presumed already to be so damaged
and dangerously affected as to warrant its removal, and that
(b) the operation is not just a separation of the embryo or
fetus from its site within the part (which would be a direct
abortion from a uterine appendage) and that
(c) the operation cannot be postponed without notably
increasing the danger to the mother. I I
This version of the Directives would appear to require that the mother suffer
rather extensive bodily damage or at least be in serious danger of such
damage before anything can be done. Methotrexate and some other
conservative medical and surgical options are desirable in part precisely
because they can be used before the degree of damage described above has
occurred. This version of the Directives inclines us to believe that acting
significantly before serious harm occurs is morally suspect at the least.
However that may be, this version has been superseded by the 1994 version,
stating succinctly: "In case of an extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is
morally licit which constitutes a direct abortion.,,12 One might argue that the
absence of specific prohibitions means that the bishops no longer teach that
such prohibitions hold. Obviously, this is not to say that the teaching is
reversed, but only to suggest the possibility of applying casuistic reasoning
to an area in which Church teaching is not fully explicit or is open to
theological dispute. 13 The reformulation in fav-or of vagueness is taken to
invite theological speculation about the moral significance of various
treatment options that are available now, when ectopic pregnancy is
diagnosable very soon after implantation and before significant damage has
been done to the mother's body. Alternatively, one can say that the proper
way to read the current version of the Directives is in the light of the
previous version. The reformulation has no teaching significance and does

228

Linacre Quarterly

l

not cast doubt on what was taught in the preceding version for more than
twenty years. The change could perhaps be explained in other ways besides
alleging a specific intention on the part of the bishops no longer to teach
what used to be taught.
The need to cope with these four areas of uncertainty simultaneously
makes it difficult to see one' s way clear to a solution. It is unsurprising to
find that people hold divergent views on this complex matter and persist in
their disagreement. We will now tum directly to Fr. Clark' s handling of this
question in order to point the way to a different kind of solution.

Fr. Clark's Analysis
Fr. Clark' s analysis is preceded by a summary description of the
biology of tubal pregnancy, the action of methotrexate, and then a review of
the main features of arguments in favor of and against the use of
methotrexate. Both sides of the debate are framed in the traditional moral
categories of the "three fonts" (object, intention, and circumstances) and
both utilize the principle of double effect. These argument summaries reflect
the various sides of the difficulties discussed above. Fr. Clark' s own analysis
consists of articulating his agreement with the argument in favor of the use
of methotrexate. He does not resolve the conflict between the divergent
parties of the dispute but allies himself with one side.14 His analysis does not
refute the alternative view, a fact Clark himself acknowledges by turning to
the casuistic tradition, specifically probabilism, which his paper explains is
appropriate when one is in doubt about the lawfulness or lawlessness of an
action. Ultimately, Clark concludes that the intrinsic strength of the
arguments in favor of the use of methotrexate, which are characterized as
"cogent but not conclusive," coupled with the endorsement of these
arguments by eminent theologians render " solidly probable" the opinion that
one may act in accordance with this opinion, despite the persistence of
arguments in favor of the alternative view ~5
There are limitations to this approach. Objections concerning the
quality of his casuistry and of the argumentation in support of the probability
of his position have already appeared in these pages. 16 The decisive point,
according to the casuists, is that probabilism does not apply in the case under
discussion .
. . . [A]II the "moral systems" tolerated in the Church (equiprobabalism, probabilism, probabiliorism) agree that the
area of application of the rules of prudence has defmite
limits. It may not be extended so far beyond the sphere of
legal obligation as to jeopardize any good essential for
salvation. In all cases of doubt, if no other good is at stake
August, 200 I
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beyond the rectitude of conscience (honestas agentis) the
rules of prudence may be applied. But if a good
transcending the subjective correctness of conscience is
placed in jeopardy, a good which we must safeguard, or
there is menace of an evil we must shun, the safer way is to
be followed in all doubtful cases. The reason is evident.
Moral conduct is not to be considered solely in the light of
its inner rectitude, but also in its bearing and influence on
the order of existence. Because the effects of an act quite
frequently do not depend exclusively on the sincere
conviction of the agent, it follows that in many cases the
safe view (sententia tutior, not sententia certior) must be
followed, even though the opposite position is more
probable. this holds good for all in the following instances:
if there is question of the valid administration of the
sacraments; if one' s own salvation is at stake; if the
following of a merely probable opinion might result in
temporal or spiritual damage to one's neighbor, which we
are obliged to avoid. 17

The import of this for the case at hand is that if one uses methotrexate when
one is only probably certain that this is not a direct abortion, one runs the
risk of doing just that, bringing about the death of the child directly. To put
it bluntly, one does not gamble what one cannot afford to lose. It is not just
that "someone" might die as a result of this course of action, but the child,
whom both mother and physician have a certain obligation to protect, may
die. According to casuistic tradition, the doubts attendant to the case do not
support the use of methotrexate on the basis ofprobabilism.
Even admitting the central point of the above passage, we are left
with the difficulties with which we started. We are left with a practical
resolution (different from that of Fr. Clark) in the presence of the uncertainty
of our understanding of the situation. In other words, rather than resolving
our doubt in favor of freedom, we are doing so in favor of the law or our
obligation to avoid possibly becoming responsible for a direct abortion. The
persistence of the difficulties reviewed above invites further discussion of
these same issues in the light of additional experience with and reflection on
these same matters. In other words, the meaning of the result of casuistic
reflection is that we know by following this course of action we will not
commit a bad action, a violation of the moral law, or a failure in our
responsibility. Nevertheless, we do not on this basis understand our action as
positively good, noble, or admirable. We know our action as a non-violation
of the law. Yet the text quoted above indicates that it is crucial to pay
attention to the real world significance of the reasons for the moral law.
The characteristic defect of the casuistic approach is that it embodies
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a legalistic understanding of moral good and bad. Even when casuistry
shows us the way to what we ought to do, it is difficult to resist the
impression that this achievement is akin to following the tax code correctly,
taking advantage of those and only those exemptions and deductions
allowed to us, but dutifully paying what is · required. In casuistry, the
emphasis falls on the laws we should obey (or, just possibly, might not have
to obey), not on the character of the life we lead by the choices we make. As
we all know, following laws is not a complete description of how we should
live. A different approach would pay more attention to character of life and
less to a narrow focus on fulfilling obligations.
A Different Approach: Emphasizing Character

Machiavelli, who knew something about the difference between the
way we should live and the way we actually do live, knew also about the
power of seeming to be other than we are. Although most people judge
others by appearances, our character (or what we are) is more fundamental
than what we seem to be. Few people are nothing more than what they seem
to be at first sight and we can come to much more adequate assessments of
others by examining what they say and do, which are indications of
character. Machiavelli illustrates this in his play Mahdragola, in which one
character, Ligurio, tries to assess another, Timoteo, who is a priest. Ligurio
asks the priest to help his friend (Nicia) with a "strange case," in which
Nicia's relative--a young, unmarried woman in the care of a convent-has
become pregnant. Ligurio explains that the woman's family is prepared to
grant Fr. Timoteo a large sum of money for charitable works if the priest can
"remedy" this situation. Timoteo has been predisposed to assist and when he
learns that his role would consist of "persuading the abbess to give the girl a
potion to make her miscarry," he responds that this is "something to be
thought over." Ligurio helps him to think it over by stating the situation with
exceptional clarity:
Keep in mind, in doing this, how many goods will result
from it; you maintain the honor of the convent, of the girl,
of her relatives; you restore a daughter to her father; you
satisfy [Nicia] here, and so many of his relatives; you do as
much charity as you can with these three hundred ducats;
and on the other side, you don't offend anything but a piece
of unborn flesh, without sense, which could be dispersed in
a thousand ways.18

Ligurio describes a situation and supports his proposal with a textbookquality utilitarian calculation. If we are offended by Ligurio's proposal and
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dispirited by Timoteo's acceptance of it, we can remind ourselves that,
according to the play, the girl and the situation are complete fictions. Ligurio
invents this case in order to see what kind of priest Timoteo is. 19 Not the
case, but the priest's character is the central concern. Timoteo is not a
scoundrel; he apparently is genuinely interested in performing charitable
deeds. Nevertheless, his zeal for good works renders him willing to overlook
some significant points of theology and to be used by the crafty Ligurio.
Timoteo is not a crude hypocrite with a hidden life that is completely
inconsistent with his priesthood. Timoteo needs to be able to make his
actions appear to himself to be consistent with his priesthood. When
Timoteo assents to Ligurio' s proposal in the strange case, he reveals his
character and Ligurio knows he has found the kind of priest he needs.
Timoteo's character is important to Ligurio because he wants the
priest to persuade an overtly pious woman that it is no sin for her to commit
adultery in order to become pregnant. Ligurio's scheme is complicated. It
involves giving the woman what is supposed to be a fertility potion, one
consequence of which is said to be that the first man to have sexual relations
with her will die. The remedy for this is to substitute someone besides her
husband, who agrees with the scheme because he desperately wants a child.
At first the woman recoils from the manifest immorality of the plan, but in
conversation with Fr. Timoteo she is or appears to be easily confused. She
can be led to rely not upon her own judgment or conscience, but upon that of
the priest. Ligurio enlists also the aid of the woman's mother, who assures
her daughter: "I have told you and tell you again that if Frate Timoteo tells
you that there's no burden of conscience here, you may do it without
thinking about it.,,20 Fr. Timoteo is confident that he can convince the
woman because her goodness will incline her to trust him and his greater
expertise in complex moral theology will enable him to recast her strange
case. He tells her that he spent hours at his books studying her case and
found that "As to the conscience, you have to take this general principle: that
where there is a certain good and an uncertain evil, one should never leave
that good for fear of that evil." So she ought to pursue what is certain
(pregnancy) over what the priest says is doubtful (the death of her partner in
adultery). Fr. Timoteo swears to her by his consecrated heart that she should
obey her husband and she finally agrees: 1
It is useful to consider this portion of Mandragola because it clearly
illustrates both why casuistry tends to arise and its limitations. In addition to
the limitations already mentioned, it is important to recognize another, the
significance of which is not often appreciated. The difficulty involved with
correctly interpreting, applying, and following complex moral laws that
admit extensive and subtle distinctions (not to mention the importance of
doing so correctly) leads to the reliance of ordinary people upon experts.

232

Linacre Quarterly

This is one important reason that casuistry tends to arise. Ordinary people,
who must execute decisions, come to disbelieve in their ability to understand
the moral dimension of their actions. They rely more or less blindly upon
experts in the law, those who are skilled with the terminology of reflex
principles, kinds of conscience, degrees of probability, and so on. This opens
the space for "experts," like Fr. Timoteo, who are able to lead people (who
may well be innocent) into perverse interpretations of the moral law.
Alternatively, it opens the space for less innocent people like Ligurio to
"shop around" for a priest who will tell them that something they want to do
is "no burden of conscience."
Resolution
Looking, then, at Fr. Clark's case, not through the lens of casuistry's
rules for resolution of doubt, but with an eye attentive to the moral features
of actions, we notice that it reduces to this: A woman wishes to have a child;
she is in fact pregnant, but there is no reason to suppose that this child will
survive to term. 22 Moreover, there is good reason to think that the use of
methotrexate offers the best if not the only chance of her ever giving birth to
a child in the future. Even if we allow the controversial or problematic belief
that methotrexate brings about the death of the embryo only indirectly,23 we
must recognize that the child will die as a result of this intervention. In the
absence of an immediate threat to the mother's life, what justifies an
intervention with fatal consequences for the embryo? The answer can only
be the goal of protecting the mother's fertility so that she might later satisfy
her wish to give birth. In other words, faced with this situation, the woman
who elects to use methotrexate determines that that desire is the paramount
concern. To the extent that methotrexate is desirable because it offers the
best hope for future fertility, despite its possible or probable abortifacient
quality, the decision to use methotrexate in this situation amounts to a
willingness to cause the death of this child, at least indirectly, not because
one's own life is in danger, but because one's own desire is in danger of
being frustrated. The woman's character as revealed or constituted by such a
decision is not so much a matter of the contradiction between a desire for a
child and the destruction of a child. Instead, the woman's character is
established in the pursuit of her desire for a child despite the presence of this
other child, who does not apparently satisfy her desire and who presents an
obstacle to the satisfaction of her desire. Her attachment to her noble and
generous concern for a child obscures her appreciation of the cost of
satisfying that concern in her unfortunate circumstances, that is, it makes her
less than generously protective of the life of the child within her.
The focus on character may seem to amount to an effort to pass
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judgment on people who are forced by circumstances to make difficult
decisions under great strain, which passing of judgment is understood to be
objectionable in principle. [n a sense this is true, but not in a sense that
makes it objectionable. To pass judgment on the type of character revealed
or constituted by the type of decision under discussion is not to make a
personal condemnation of the individual involved. The subjective moral
dimension (the personal responsibility of the mother, physician, and various
24
others and their moral standing in the eyes of God) is not here at issue. All
of this means that to reject the use of methotrexate in the situation under
discussion on the basis of the character its use forms is akin to condemning
as bad the kinds of acts that make people cowardly, self-indulgent, or selfish
or to praising as good the kinds of acts that make people courageous,
moderate, or gentle. We can and must pass this sort of judgment without
assessing the subjective moral standing of individuals and the various
mitigating circumstances that can be expected to modify the moral
responsibility of people who make serious decisions in difficult situations. It
is incomparably easier to analyze the moral features of this sort of situation
in advance than it is to make a good decision in a clinical setting. [t is for
this reason that we try to identify what action is best before we face the
pressure of the clinical setting. [n other words, the tensions that might
exculpate an individual who makes a decision under pressure are not
necessarily relevant to those who must say, under a cooler light and free of
pressure, what decision would be best and what action they would hope to
have the strength to perform.
It is probably helpful to state more directly the conclusion of this
line of reasoning. In the case of Judy and Ray methotrexate offers hope of
preserving Judy's life and health (i.e., future fertility) although it will also
result in the death of the embryo within her. This latter consequence is
justifiable, if it is justifiable, because something equally serious, Judy's life,
is at stake and the embryo' s death results indirectly from the protection of
Judy's life. But Judy' s life is not at stake. She would not be a candidate for
methotrexate treatment if her life were in any serious danger; medical
treatment is pursued when other considerations are more important (cost,
surgical risks, etc.). 25 As the case is described to us, the paramount concern
is the preservation of her future fertility. More precisely, it is not her fertility
in the abstract that is at issue, but her stated desire to have a child. The
argument is based upon the wish to be able to satisfy her desire. The impulse
to avoid the stem possibility that the satisfaction of her desire might not be
available is the basis for the argument in favor of methotrexate in this case.
Rather than allowing this impulse to govern our view of what should be
done, it is appropriate to look at the action to which this thinking leads. Just
as any mother would sacrifice her future fertility to save the life of her living
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child, Judy should be encouraged to accept that she is already a mother and
must face the possibility that responsible care for the life within her might
have serious consequences for her~6
Fr. Clark implies but does not state explicitly that Judy and Ray are
Catholic and that they are married. If they are, perhaps they can be
persuaded to recognize that the goodness or nobility of their desire to have
children is not due to the fact that it is their fervent desire, but because of its
coherence with their state of life and the life to which God calls them. The
pain of their situation, and the possibility that they will never raise children
of their own, suggests that God ' s plan for them may not be what they
thought it was. They display and constitute their character as good parents
when they generously accept the child that they actually have without
allowing their wish for a different child to cause them to overlook the
significance of this life. The character of the action that they take reveals its
goodness or its badness when we look at it from this perspective much more
clearly than when we look primarily to the terms and technicalities of the
law.

Concluding Statement
In the approach offered here, actions are assessed not merely for
their conformity to law but primarily for what they determine us to be. It
may seem that this perspective is too global or vague and that it lacks the
sophistication or precision that seems to be necessary for appreciating the
many intricacies of this issue. It may seem that this approach renders the
matter too simply without coming to terms with the doubts and difficulties
reviewed above. On the contrary, excessive attention to the technicalities of
the medical 27 and casuistic dimensions of this matter has drawn attention
away from the primary moral features, which are visible especially, if not
exclusively, from this perspective. The point is that actions are good or bad
based upon what they are and what kind of life is embraced by performing
those actions. Some actions are incongruent with a noble, good, or holy life.
It is for this reason that people speak of moral laws forbidding them. In order
to evaluate courses of action, it is the real-world meaning of those actions to
which we must primarily appeal, not to the terms and technicalities of the
law.
It might also seem that this approach is equally open to the kind of
abuse of moral reasoning that Machiavelli portrays. It might seem that the
approach presented here amounts to no more than casting decisions in good
light or bad light and that the same decision can easily be cast in both ways.
This may perhaps be true and may be an inescapable feature of all moral
reasoning. There remains, however, this advantage over the casuistic
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approach. Here, our attention is drawn to the primary moral phenomena, not
to the formulations of the law. The difference between a good and bad
appraisal of the moral character of an action will be established by its
adequacy in dealing with all of the moral features of the action. Even in
Machiavelli ' s case, we are forced to take Fr. Timoteo's word for what he has
found in his books, but the moral corruption of the various characters in the
play is manifestly clear. We do best to attend to the moral phenomena in the
world.
Interest in using methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancy has been
growing for the past twenty years. Salpingostomy is still the "gold standard,"
but methotrexate is increasingly ·common in some places for selected
patients. 28 There is reason to expect that methotrexate and other forms of
medical management will become more widespread in the future,
considering the enthusiasm with which it has been received by some: "The
use of methotrexate for the treatment of EP may be one of the greatest
advances in gynecology in this century.,,29 Plainly, this evaluation is
possible only for someone who is indifferent to the significance of this
treatment for the unfortunate but not yet irrelevant developing embryo.
Concern for this life must be displayed, if it is not to be extinguished
entirely, primarily by noble and generous actions of people in difficult
circumstances and secondarily by prudent counsel from those who advise
them.
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